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Abstract: We use the portfolio theory to analyze the lawyer's decision regarding the
type of case the lawyer will handle. We offer some insights into the widespread idea that
contingency lawyers are providing a risk sharing service. We demonstrate that a
contingent fee lawyer diversifies his portfolio. We show that reputation induces more, but
not fully, concentration, since a lawyer with greater reputation or expertise selects more
risky cases. The size of the law firm has the same result.
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THE LAWYER AS A PORTFOLIO MANAGER: HOW DOES THE FEE SYSTEM INFLUENCE ON THE
LAWYER'S DECISION OF HANDLING LEGAL CLAIM?

INTRODUCTION
Lawyer fee arrangements are subject to a current debate. Contingent fees are widely
used in the United States, but are banned or regulated in many other countries (Great
Britain, France). In those countries, clients generally paid their lawyer at an hourly fee or
a fixed fee. The standard description of the contingent fees is no win, no pay: the lawyer
receives a fixed percentage of the amount recovered from the other side if the case is
won; he receives nothing if the case is lost. Literature on contingent fees is by no means
new and has offered several economics explanations pro and con contingent fees.
Several articles have emphasized benefits from allowing the use of contingent fees.
Tying the lawyer's fees to the recovery induces the lawyer to exert an efficient level of
effort. Contingent fees are a response to a moral hazard problem1. They may also be a
response to asymmetric information between the plaintiff and the lawyer2. In other
articles, contingent fees are criticized. They are supposed to provide incentives for
lawyers to settle cases earlier than clients would wish. Contingent fees are assumed to
spur frivolous litigation, since lawyers accept cases with little legal merit3. In summary,
the literature concludes that depending on details of the case, either an hourly or a
contingent fee system can be the best.
In this article, we do not try to resolve the debate about which explanation of
contingent fees is the most accurate. We propose an analysis of the contingency fee
lawyer as a portfolio manager. In the portfolio theory, an investor decides whether or not
to acquire an asset with uncertain rate of return. Thinking in terms of the portfolio model,
lawyers have to evaluate potential cases in terms of the risks involved and the potential
returns from the case in order to decide whether or not to drop it. We search for how
much time a lawyer will invest in a particular case. Contingency lawyers have to hold a
portfolio of cases so as to hedge the risks they are taking on...they are allocating their
time based on which cases will produce greater value on margin4. In doing so, lawyers
control the flow of cases into the legal market.
This paper employs the opportunity cost approach rather than explicitly including the
lawyer's cost of effort. Most papers in this literature assume that the lawyer works on
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one case and the cost of effort into that case is given by some parameter proportional to
the amount of effort devoted into that case. Instead of taking the conventional approach,
we take more realistic route by saying that the cost of effort putting into one case comes
precisely from being prohibited from working on another case, given the total labor/hour
constraint. Using opportunity cost creates a correlation between cases. By selecting a
risky case the lawyer rejects the riskless case and vice versa.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we set out the basic model
based on the idea that lawyers resemble portfolio managers. Section 3 discusses the
hourly fee arrangement and considers the law firm's behavior. Section 4 provides a brief
conclusion. All proofs are in appendix.

I- A SIMPLE MODEL
Kritzer5 discusses three elements of risk facing lawyers: liability risk, quantum risk
and effort risk. Liability risk concerns the variation in the likelihood of verdicts favouring
plaintiffs. Quantum risk speaks of uncertainty on the amount that will be recovered. Even
if there is no uncertainty about whether the plaintiff (and so the lawyer) will win,
uncertainty probably remains with regard to damages. Effort risk refers to the uncertainty
over the amount of time the case actually looks. According to three studies6, Kritzer7
exhibits that the probability of success was almost always lowest in medical malpractice.
Datas collected by the Civil Litigation Research Project show that the risk that a lawyer
receives no fee is higher in federal cases (26% of the cases) than in state cases (17%).
Torts and contract cases involve less liability risk (17%) than do cases involving other
types of issues (38%). Uncertainty regarding damages is more difficult to assess.
Kritzer8 proposes to measure quantum risk by computing a ratio of recovery to stakes.
Stakes was defined as the lawyer's assessment of what a reasonable settlement would
have been. His results exhibit that the risk in tort and contract cases is similar but less
than the risk in other cases. So, we can reasonably assume that there exist different
types of cases which differ from each other according to the associated risk. There may
be routine cases in which the risk is small or null (auto accident cases or security social
cases, for example), and there may be risky cases (medical malpractice cases, for
example).
We assume a risk-averse lawyer with an initial wealth of 100$. To capture the risk
aversion we shall assume that an award of 10$ gives to the lawyer a utility of log(10) =
2.3. He has to share his working time, say 1 hour, between two legal claims: a risk-free
case and a risky case.
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A case is characterized by two elements: the probability of prevailing at court and
the amount of the recovery. In other words, a case combines liability risk and quantum
risk.
We shall consider that the awards of both cases depend on the time devoted by the
lawyer. The risk free case award is given by (number of hours)×900$. This award is
certain. The risky case award is given by (number of hours)×R×2000$ with R > 1. The
parameter R reduces variance and increases expected reward of risky case. It may
reflect two ways in which cases interrelate. The first is the impact of reputation9. A
second way may be the lawyer's own expertise. Let us consider that R = 2. We shall
consider that the probability of prevailing the risky case is 60%10.
We shall assume that the market for lawyers is competitive11.
Under a contingent fee arrangement, the lawyer receives a percentage of the
recovery and bears 100% of the cost. This corresponds to the dominant form of
contingent fee used in United-States. Most datas indicate (Survey of lawyers handling
cases in the federal district court conducted by RAND Corporation, survey conducted by
the Alaska Judicial Council) that contingency fees are far from uniform. Only about 5060 percent of fees are one-third. Some datas sets point out fees exceeding one-third
and fees less than-third12.
To simplify, we assume that the lawyer charges the same percentage 30% for both
risky and riskless legal claims.
The lawyer will choose the allocation of his working time between risky and riskless
legal claims to maximize his expected utility. If he decides to allocate all his working time
on the riskless project, his award is (1 hour)×30% ×900$ = 270$. His wealth is 270$ +
100$ = 370$, which gives him a utility of 5.91. If he decides to devote all his time to the
risky case, his award is (1 hour)×30% ×R×2000$ = 1200$ if he wins. Hence, his wealth if
he wins is 1200$ + 100$ = 1300$ and 100$ if he looses, i.e. his initial wealth. His utility
is 6.14. Suppose now that he shares equally his time, his utility becomes 6.22.
Therefore, the lawyer is better off when he engages in diversification by handling a mix
of cases.
The following graphic shows his expected utility for all time allocation. We see that
the optimal time allocation is to devote 66% of the working time to risky legal claims.
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The lawyer chooses a mix of routine cases which are riskless (low but certain
payoffs) and riskier cases which result in high payoffs. This strategy allows him to
engage in a kind of hedging: low risk cases cover the overhead but the high risk fees
produce the profits. The number of hours devoted to risky legal claim is such that the
marginal cost related to the additional risky claim, in other words the loss related to the
riskless claim that is not handled, is equal to the marginal benefit from the additional
risky claim.
Reputation and the level of contingent fees have important implications for how the
lawyer devotes his time. A lawyer with a higher reputation devotes more time on risky
case. More reputation increases the award of the risky case, which induces the lawyer to
devote more time on this case.
Change in the contingency percentages modifies also the allocation of time. This
change may come from change in the market structure or this can be the government or
the bar association, which fixes the percentages and decides to change them. The effect
of this change is straightforward: an increase in the risky (riskless) contingent fee
induces the lawyer to select more risky (riskless) cases.
However, any same change in both contingency percentages involves opposite
effects on the allocation of time since it renders both the riskless and risky cases more
attractive. The lawyer is both induced to increase his working time on both cases but he
cannot because of his time constraint. The award of the riskless case being greater
increases his certain wealth, as an increase in his initial wealth. Hence, he becomes less
risk averse and he is more interested by risky cases. Moreover, the expected award of
the risky case also increases. Finally, he will devote more times on risky cases.

II- DISCUSSION
A- HOURLY FEE
Contingent fees are widely used in the United States, but are banned or regulated in
many other countries (Great Britain, France). In those countries, clients generally paid
their lawyer at an hourly fee or a fixed fee. We now consider the lawyer's decision
regarding how many hours he devotes to risky case under hourly fee arrangement.
Under this arrangement, the lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the
case. The lawyer bears no risk.
It is straightforward that under hourly fee arrangement, the lawyer fully concentrates
his portfolio of legal claims on cases that offers the higher fees. Due to the fully
concentration, one type of plaintiff is excluded of the legal market.
The advantage of contingent fees is that they ensure that no plaintiff is excluded
from the lawyers’ market. Indeed, even if characteristics of riskless and risky cases are
such that the lawyer fully concentrates his portfolio13, then the government or the bar
association can differentiate fees for risky and riskless legal claims to ensure that no
plaintiff is excluded.

B- LAW FIRM
One characteristic of the legal market is the coexistence of variety of forms and
structures of law firms. Clark14 separates law firms into four categories: solo practitioner
including small law firms (up to five lawyers), middle-sized law firms running from six
lawyers to fifty, and large firms having over fifty lawyers. The solo or small practitioner
must develop a strategy for client development. Concerns of reputation and advertising
are options. Large law firms handle diversified problems from domestic relations, real
estate and personal injury to problems in international trade, intellectual property or
environmental torts. Middle-sized firms often do labor and employment, larger personal
injury, as medical malpractice. It seems to exist a specialization of firms according to
their size. Nevertheless, inside a category, we may assume the existence of different
kinds of legal claims according to the associated risk. All antitrust claim or divorce does
not involve the same risk.
Obviously, management of portfolio will be different depending on the size of the law
firm. By assuming that larger law firms can achieve more economies of scale or
synergies, these two features will increase the initial wealth.
The more realistic approach of the risk aversion considers that richer people are less
risk averse than poorer ones. Hence, with a higher initial wealth, a law firm is less risk
averse and hence is less reluctant to support risky legal claims. As it might be expected,
larger law firms devote more time on risky cases. It follows that larger law firm handle
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more risky cases than smaller law firm. This conclusion corresponds to the observations
made by Clark15.

CONCLUSION
The contribution of the paper is to model the idea that the lawyer represents a
portfolio of cases. We study the selection of cases for inclusion in the portfolio when
cases interrelate in two ways. First, we use an opportunity cost approach, that is time
devoted to a case is no more available to another case. Second, we introduce a
parameter, which reflects the impact of reputation. In this framework, we show that a
contingent fee lawyer diversifies his portfolio by handling a mix of cases. Conversely, an
hourly fee lawyer fully concentrates his portfolio by handling only one type of cases.
Consequently, one type of plaintiff is locked out the legal market.
Another contribution of the paper is to study the role of reputation. As mentioned
above, reputation is important as a form of correlation between cases. Reputation has a
second role as a form of incentives constraint. We show that reputation induces more,
but not fully, concentration, since a lawyer with greater reputation or expertise selects
more risky cases. The size of the law firm has the same effect.
Measures to limit contingent fees are likely to have most impact on the routine cases
rather than on the risky cases since under contingent fees, the flow of cases into the
legal market is more diversified. No type of claim is left outside the legal market.
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